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Introduction: Right in Front of our Eyes 
 
One of the most popular, because easy to understand, products of contemporary cognitive 
psychology is the so-called ‘McGurk effect’. The effect was first outlined in Nature in 1976 
by Harry McGurk and John MacDonald, who discovered by chance the potential for visual 
cues to interfere with auditory information in the perceptual field. Experiments have shown 
that if a sound recording of the same repeated phoneme (for example, ‘ba ba ba’) is paired 
with recordings of a set of lips pronouncing first the same phoneme (ba ba ba) and then a 
different one (for example, ‘fa fa fa’), the visual information will tend to override the 
auditory. More often than not, the perceiver of the audio-visual recording will first hear ‘ba 
ba ba’, and then hear ‘fa fa fa’, even though the sound has not in fact changed. The lessons 
derived from the McGurk effect are predictable: that speech perception depends on sensory 
integration, that vision is the dominant sense, and that our eyes can be tricked, or rather, that 
our eyes can trick our other senses. 
 
It is tempting to detect in the McGurk effect an unlikely alliance, or at least homologous 
relations, between cognitivist theory and ideology critique. The latter also teaches us to 
distrust appearances and to search for a set of real relations underlying the deceptive surface 
of things. As Bertolt Brecht said about a photograph of a factory, ‘less than ever does the 
mere reflection of reality reveal anything about reality. A photograph of the Krupp works or 
the A.E.G. tells us next to nothing about these institutions. The reification of human relations 
– the factory, say – means that they are no longer explicit. Something must in fact be built up, 
something artificially posed’.1 Brecht raises the stakes rather higher than McGurk and 
McDonald, but does at least coincide with them in his wariness about the visual field more 
generally, in its capacity to deceive. 
 
This special issue of Parallax does not take the McGurk effect as its theoretical starting point, 
but rather as a form of common sense to be contested. Leaving aside the techno-historical 
 
 
contingency of the effect, which is made possible only through modern sound and video 
recording and editing equipment, we are tempted to say that our contemporary situation is 
quite the opposite of what McGurk and McDonald discovered: the visual field (and, why not, 
the auditory as well) is not potentially duplicitous, as they comfortingly make out, but rather, 
it is right there, in front of our eyes (or ears). This, of course, is no guarantee that we will see 
or hear what is directly in front of us, for sometimes the best place to hide is right out in the 
open, as Edgar Allan Poe demonstrated with his purloined letter. 
 
Jacques Lacan, one of the best readers of ‘The Purloined Letter’, is a central reference point 
in this issue, even if his famous essay is not. Our initial points of orientation are in fact 
earlier, coming from seemingly disparate parts of the theoretical tradition, as we attempt to 
forge affinities between Freud and Wittgenstein. In section 129 of Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein writes: ‘The aspects of things that are most important for us are 
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because 
it is always before one’s eyes.)’ The problem, as Wittgenstein goes on to remark, ‘is that we 
fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most valuable’.2 This concern with 
the importance, not to mention the difficulty, of seeing what is always in front of one’s eyes 
is shared by classical psychoanalysis. In his essay ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’, Freud 
describes psychoanalysis as attempting to reveal ‘secret and concealed things’, but suggests 
that these things are themselves already on the surface – ‘the scum’ (der Abhub), as he puts it, 
of our observations.
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 If we wanted to construct an ongoing genealogy of this mode of thought 
beyond psychoanalysis and ordinary-language philosophy, we could point, over fifty years 
later, to an interview Bernard Bonnefoy conducted with Michel Foucault, in which Foucault 
points out that his philosophy is ‘not trying to reveal things that have been deeply buried, 
hidden, forgotten for centuries or millennia, nor of discovering, behind what’s been said by 
others, the secret they wished to hide [...] [It is] simply trying to make apparent what is very 
immediately present and at the same time invisible [...] To grasp that invisibility, that 
invisible of the too visible, that distancing of what is too close, that unknown familiarity’4 
 
The political implications of Foucault’s attempt can be mapped out very clearly in a text that 
sets itself up against Poe’s ‘spooks’ – Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man.  
 
 
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan Poe; 
nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, of flesh 
and bone, fiber and liquids – and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, 
understand, simply because people refuse to see me.
5
  
Ellison’s ‘Prologue’ puns on being a ‘man of substance’ and belonging to the ‘great 
American tradition of tinkers’ in order to reflect on the political potential of refusing a simple 
logic of demystification. Wittgenstein’s assertion that ‘we find certain things about seeing 
puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough’,6 is given 
here a full relational quality. The invisibility of which the Prologue speaks is not ‘exactly a 
matter of a bio-chemical accident to my epidermis’ but occurs instead ‘because of a peculiar 
disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact. A matter of the construction of 
their inner eyes, those eyes with which they look through their physical eyes upon reality.’7 
Far from providing any kind of easy resolution, the protagonist’s invisibility leads to the 
violence in which a ‘tall white man’ is ‘almost killed by a phantom’, ‘mugged by an invisible 
man!’ and to his battle against ‘Monopolated Light & Power’, carried out by the protagonist 
through an act of sabotage which fills his ‘hole’ with a series of impossibly harsh lights: 
‘Perhaps you’ll think it strange that an invisible man should need light, desire light, love 
light. But maybe it is exactly because I am invisible. Light confirms my reality, gives birth to 
my form.’8 By inhabiting desired selves both longed for and despised, the self in Invisible 
Man does not emerge from dialogic interaction or lead to resolutions, but constantly flips one 
position into its opposite, darkness into light, meekness into a dangerous activity, and vice 
versa. 
 
This brief example from a novel that thinks of blackness not as a given, as something to 
recognise, but as the result of an interaction between what can and cannot be seen when ‘right 
in front of your eyes’ encapsulates some of the theoretical, philosophical, aesthetic and 
political issues that this special issue of Parallax, ‘Right in Front of our Eyes’, sets out to 
analyse. The essays that follow ask, in different ways, why we routinely fail to notice the 
‘aspects’ of things ‘that are most important for us’ and speculate on the potential 
consequences of this ‘aspect-blindness’. They ask at what point, and under what conditions, 
the immediately present becomes invisible, and what might it mean to allow ourselves to be 
struck by that which is already in plain sight. How might such instances be made possible? In 
 
 
this respect, the issue’s interest is in a variety of double-takes, gestalt switches, un/disguised 
psychic treasures, blind spots and duck-rabbits.  At stake therefore in many of the issue’s 
essays is the practice of ‘surface reading’ of a literary or non-literary text, as well as potential 
critical responses to such a practice.  Does an emphasis on seeing what is right in front of our 
eyes reveal an anti-philosophical aversion to depth? Or, indeed, an attempt to sidestep the 
complexities of ideology? What of Heidegger’ view that ‘concealing’ and ‘disclosing’, hiding 
and letting-be, are always inextricably connected.
9
 Do certain forms of philosophical and 
political ‘blindness’ have their uses in the context of a culture fascinated by ‘seeing all’? 
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